2016 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

5-2-2016

USA v. Cosme Ordaz

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Cosme Ordaz" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 434.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/434

This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

DLD-182

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 15-3547
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
COSME ORDAZ,
Appellant
__________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 98-cr-00587-16)
District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis
__________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 17, 2016

Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and SLOVITER1, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 2, 2016)
____________
OPINION*
____________
The Honorable Dolores K. Sloviter participated in the decision in this case. Judge
Sloviter assumed inactive status on April 4, 2016 after the submission date, but before the
filing of the opinion. This opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 46(d) and Third Circuit I.O.P. Chapter 12.
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

PER CURIAM
Cosme Ordaz appeals from an order of the District Court granting, but only in
part, his motion for a reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). For the
reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.
In 1998, Ordaz was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania with conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and use of a telephone in furtherance of a drug conspiracy, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on
both counts. Ordaz was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 360 months. We
affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing in light
of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See United States v. Ordaz, 398 F.3d
236 (3d Cir.2005). On remand, Ordaz was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 298
months. In calculating the applicable Guidelines range, the sentencing court found that
Ordaz’s criminal activity involved between 5 and 15 kilograms of cocaine, which
produced a base offense level of 32. Additionally, the court assessed a 3-level
enhancement for his managerial role in the conspiracy, bringing his offense level up to
35. With a category VI criminal history, Ordaz’s resulting Guidelines range was 292 365 months. His actual sentence of 298 months thus was 6 months above the lower end
of that range. We affirmed the new sentence. See United States v. Ordaz, 227 F. App’x
170 (3d Cir. 2007). Ordaz then unsuccessfully pursued relief from his conviction and
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
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On April 29, 2015, Ordaz filed a motion to reduce his sentence, 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2), pursuant to Amendment 782. Specifically, Ordaz sought a 2-level reduction
in his offense level from 35 to 33. The Federal Public Defender was appointed to
represent Ordaz and communications with the Government then ensued. The
Government evidently advised counsel that Ordaz was entitled to only a 1-level reduction
in his offense level, from 35 to 34, because he was a career offender. The District Court
eventually granted Ordaz’s motion, but only to the extent of a 1-level reduction in his
offense level from 35 to 34. The Court imposed a new sentence of 268 months’
imprisonment, thus retaining the sentencing judge’s determination to assign a length of
incarceration that was 6 months above the lower end of the Guidelines range.
Ordaz filed a pro se motion for reconsideration, in which he argued that the
sentencing court never specifically found that he was a career offender, and that the
finding in the Presentence Report was insufficient to establish career offender status
under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The Government, pursuant to the District Court’s order,
submitted a response to the reconsideration motion, and argued that Ordaz was wrong on
both counts. The Government argued that, because Ordaz was a career offender, any
reduction in his sentence was capped at an offense level of 34. The Government asserted
and documented that the transcript of the resentencing hearing showed that there were no
objections to the facts in the Presentence Report, and that Ordaz had lodged no objections
to the findings in the Presentence Report, including the criminal history calculation and
the finding that his criminal record classified him as a career offender. The Government
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argued that Ordaz’s failure to object to the facts and conclusions in the Presentence
Report constituted an admission of those facts and conclusions.
In an order entered on December 11, 2015, the District Court agreed with the
Government’s position and denied Ordaz’s motion for reconsideration. The Court
explained that Ordaz was a career offender, citing ¶ 116 of the Presentence Report, and
that his status as a career offender would have dictated an offense level of 34 had the
sentencing court not applied the higher offense level of 35 from § 2D1.2. Amendment
782 lowers offense levels by 2 as a general matter, but Ordaz’s career offender status
would cap his sentence reduction at level 34, not level 33. The Court found support for
capping the 2-level reduction pursuant to a defendant’s career offender status in United
States v. Tellis, 748 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2014) (reducing defendant’s offense level from
38 to 37 where reduction would have reduced offense level to 36 were it not capped by
application of § 4B.1 at an offense level of 37), and noted that, under our precedent,
Amendment 782 does not apply to the § 4B1.1 career offender designation, see United
States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (career offender who received no
downward departures and was sentenced within the career offender Guidelines range was
not eligible for reduction in sentence even though his base offense level had been
subsequently lowered by Amendment 706).
Ordaz appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our Clerk advised
him that the appeal was subject to summary action under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P.
10.6. Ordaz has submitted a summary action response, in which he has repeated the
arguments he made in his motion for reconsideration. Specifically, he argues that
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because he was not, in fact, sentenced under the career offender Guidelines, his offense
level should have been set by the District Court at 33, not 34. Furthermore, he argues,
the District Court should have taken into consideration his misconduct-free prison history
in reducing his sentence. With respect to the latter argument, Ordaz asserts that he has
served 202 months in prison without ever having been charged with a misconduct.
We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. The
District Court’s ultimate decision to deny a § 3582(c)(2) motion is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion, but we review de novo the District Court’s interpretation of the Guidelines.
See Mateo, 560 F.3d at 154. A District Court generally cannot modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed. Section 3582(c)(2) provides an exception “in
the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a
sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The applicable policy statement instructs that any reduction in
sentence is not consistent with the policy statement and therefore not authorized by 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) if an amendment “does not have the effect of lowering the
defendant’s applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B); United States v.
Flemming, 723 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 2013).
Here, it is undisputed that Amendment 782 lowered Ordaz’s applicable Guidelines
range by at least 1 level. But there also is no genuine dispute here that the Presentence
Report identified Ordaz as a career offender, and that, at his resentencing on August 12,
2005, the sentencing court specifically asked his counsel whether he had any objections
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to the facts in the Presentence Report; counsel responded in the negative. A defendant
who fails to object to facts asserted in the Presentence Report is deemed to have admitted
those facts. See United States v. Siegel, 477 F.3d 87, 93 (3d Cir. 2007). See also United
States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 290 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989) (“A conclusion in the
presentence investigation report which goes unchallenged by the defendant is, of course,
a proper basis for sentence determination.”). Ordaz’s sentence reduction is thus capped
at level 34, for the reasons given by the District Court; the corresponding Guidelines
range is 262-327 months, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)(2).2
In addition, the District Court was not authorized to take into consideration the
factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Section 1B1.10(b)(2) confines the extent of the
reduction authorized in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings. Courts may not reduce a defendant’s
term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(2) to a term that is less than the minimum of the
amended Guidelines range produced by the substitution, unless the sentencing court
originally imposed a term of imprisonment below the Guidelines range, Dillon v. United
States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010).
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the orders of the District
Court to the extent that the Court denied Ordaz a 2-level adjustment.
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Under § 4B1.1, an offense level of 34 applies where the statutory maximum penalty is
less than life but exceeds 25 years. Ordaz’s statutory maximum sentence was 30 years.
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